Iran’s Ceasefire Before Deterrence Point: Risks of Becoming Iraq

Iran's Ceasefire Before Deterrence

As more than month has passed since the of the third imposed war against Iran, a natural question arises: How long will be the continuation of this war?

Military equipment, logistical and financial weaknesses do not lead to defeat. Historical analytics have shown that the resistance and steadfastness of the weaker party can, with effective continuation of the war, alter the calculations of the opposing side and ultimately lead to victory. Here, “steadfastness ” refers not merely to the continuation of the war but to the to inflict effective blows to the extent that the enemy perceives costs ongoing conflict to outweigh the potential benefits.

The Consequences of a Premature Ceasefire Iran

If Iran stops the war before that pivotal point of altering calculations and particularly concedes on its most crucial and defining achievement—the Strait of Hormuz—what might the future of the country look like? Especially considering the costs of the war and prior losses? The closest historical experience in this regard could be the situation of Iraq between1990 (after the Kuwait War) and 2003 (the U.S. invasion).

Given that Iran has incurred damages since the unilateral withdrawal of the U.S. from JCA in 8, especially in clashes in 2025, it has endured heavy financial, human, and military costs. Yet, there are no signs of a shift in calculations of the other side. Evidence indicates that there is still a belief that imposing military costs can lead to gains and can decisively end the conflict. In such situation, any initiative to withdraw from the war—under the most scenario—would ultimately result in a state similar to Iraq after 1990: a government entangled in problems, multiple social crises, and the persistent of war.

This policy note is written by Ali Sanaei – Professor of University of Chicago

And Mohammad Mehdi Jafarian – Researcher and Public Policy Analyst in 2026.

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